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I. Introduction
   The paradigm of competence based strategy has had a tremendous 
influence on shaping strategy content in the last decade. Espoused by 
practitioners and used in Europe, the tenets of core competence are taught 
in business schools throughout the United States. A.dvocates of the theory 
maintain that core competence is a combination of unique resources and 
capabilities that allow firms to capture a near monopoly positions in their 
markets (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, 1994). Competence based strategies help 
firms achieve and maintain competitive advantage (Hamel and Heene, 1994; 
Itami, 1985; Legnick-Hall, 1992; Prahalad, 1998). Despite adoption within the 
business community, conceptual and theoretical development of this 
phenomena has lagged. 
   To capture the dynamism of the firm's competitive behavior one needs 
to trace the growth of the firm in terms of its resources and capabilities, in 
particular, the way resources are used. Penrose (1959) argues that "services 
yielded by resources are a function of the way in which they are used - 
exactly the same resource when used for different purposes or in different 
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ways and in combination with different types or amounts of other resources 
provides a different service or set of services (p. 25)." The uniqueness of each 
firm lies in the way the organization bundles resources and capabilities. 
   Our primary objective here is twofold. First we  wish to understand 
current thought in core competence theory and indicate where the theory is 
heading. Secondly, we attempt to examine the core competence paradigm 
and demonstrate its application by analyzing Kikkoman Corporation's 
current and historical capabilities in a case study of the company. 
   The first two sections of this paper examine the RBV (Resource-Based 
View) and C2 (Core Competence) perspectives on the firm. The two 
paradigms are inextricably linked — indeed, the C2 paradigm has its 
foundation in the RBV. The first section of the paper focuses on RBV theory. 
This section also reviews the characteristics of RBV and definitions of 
resources used in the literature. The second section examines the core 
competence paradigm in light of the RBV of the firm. This section defines 
C2 and examines how C2 is developed within firms. Among other issues the 
section describes the nature of firm specific capabilities and characteristics 
that make these capabilities unique and overviews the current research in 
the areas. A third section assesses Kikkoman Corporation's success and 
longevity through the C2 and RBV Views. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the strengths and limitations of the analysis and lays the 
groundwork for further research linking the two paradigms to evolution of 
C2 within firms.
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II. The RBV of the Firm
A. Overview 
   The theoretical base for much of the research on core competence is 
strongly linked with the development of resources and capabilities. The 
resource based view (RBV) of the firm emphasizes firm specific resources 
and capabilities as a major determinant of firm performance and competitive 
behavior (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993). The 
RBV model contends that firm specific resources enable the firm to earn 
abnormal returns/profits and assure a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Peteraf, 1993). 
   The recent emphasis on the RBV paradigm has been strategic 
management's reaction to the earlier emphasis on the impact of external 
environmental factors on strategic choices and outcomes especially as 
reflected in the predominance of Porter's Five Forces Model in strategy 
content development. Strategic management research has begun to stress 
firm's internal capabilities in order to explain and understand differences in 
firm performance. RBV addresses how to develop and utilize capabilities 
which will sustain and enhance firm performance (Lengnick-Hall, 1992). 
Wernerfelt (1984) looked at resources as the drivers of successful 
diversification, while Rumelt (1984) suggested that examination of firm 
resources was a suitable starting point for identifying products and markets 
where they could be applied. These two authors were among the first to 
explicitly focus on the management of resources. Since then considerable 
theoretical work has been done to develop the RBV paradigm (e.g., Barney, 
1986 and 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993). 
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   The theory of the firm in the resource-based view (RBV) is constructed 
to investigate the way in which the firm's resource endowment can be a 
source of abnormal profits and sustained competitive advantage (Penrose, 
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
Research on RBV is about the changes and development of skills, abilities, 
and knowledge within the firm. The emphasis is on internal resources, i.e., 
"
productive services" available and developed within the firm (Penrose, 1959). 
The role of central management is to establish and alter the administrative 
structure, give general guidelines and policies, and provide decision-making. 
Firms adapt to short term operational problems and yet must also establish 
some longer term goals. The firm is seen as an evolving collection of 
physical and human resources. To capture the dynamism of the firm's 
competitive behavior one needs to trace the growth of the firm in terms of its 
resources and capabilities and, in particular, the way resources are used. 
The uniqueness of each firm lies in the way it bundles resources and 
capabilities. The firm seeks profits to reinvest in organizational capabilities 
and thus assure the firm's long-term viability.
B. Distinguishing Characteristics of the RBV 
   The resources characteristics within the RBV theory lay the foundation 
for describing and identifying a firm's core competencies. RBV theory 
provides four conditions that are required in order for a resource to offer 
sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1986; Peteraf, 1993). The first 
condition is resource  heterogeneity. This condition implies that firms have 
differing resources and capabilities, operate at different efficiency levels, and 
thus vary in their ability to compete in the market place (Penrose, 1959). 
Important to this idea is the concept of Ricardian rents which posits that 
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resources can obtain superior rents if they are in limited supply and cannot 
be rapidly increased. These resources are limited in the short run but may 
be renewed and expanded incrementally within the firm that utilizes them. 
   A second RBV theory condition is imperfect  imitatability. To sustain 
profits a firm must possess resources that are difficult to imitate (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989). Barney (1992) proposes three reasons why resources are 
hard to imitate: a) dependence upon a unique historic conditions occurs 
when the firm is at the right place at the right time to obtain the resources 
(e.g., ownership of mineral rights); b) causal ambiguity develops when a 
firm's understanding of its own reason for success is not understood (such a 
condition thus makes it difficult for competing firms to duplicate the same 
strategies and develop the same resources); or c) social complexity occurs 
when the resources are so complex that they are difficult to manage or 
influence (e.g., a high rate innovativeness which is derived from a firm's 
culture). Such resources with any combination of these reasons tend to defy 
imitation because they have a strong tacit dimension and are difficult to fully 
understand. They may also be path dependent in the sense that they are 
contingent upon preceding levels of learning, investment, stock assets, and 
development activity. Such a path would be difficult to repeat (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989). 
   Competition may also be limited because of imperfect substitutability. 
Firms should not be able to substitute different resources to achieve the 
same performance. For example, two firms may compete in the same way 
and achieve high quality, but may utilize different resources and capabilities . 
One firm may have a production system that capitalizes upon its people and 
supplier relations, while another firm uses technology and backward 
integration to achieve superior levels of quality. These resources in and of 
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themselves do not give a competitive advantage or superior performance 
(Barney, 1986), but the way in which the firm has bundled them may. 
   The third condition is that of imperfect mobility where resources and 
capabilities cannot be traded or are less valuable to other users. Peteraf 
(1993) argues that imperfect mobility of resources may be tied to a specific 
context and other elements of the firm. This concept suggests that the 
resource must have some necessary and specific conditions to be employed 
in a manner to sustain competitive advantage. Immobile resources because 
of their idiosyncratic or firm-specific nature are heterogeneous. 
   The above three conditions are seen as cornerstones to competitive 
advantage. Peteraf (1993), Barney (1991), and others combined these 
conditions as they all relate to the conceptualization of the inability to 
duplicate resources and resource use. These authors refer to this condition 
as the inimitability of resources (Barney, 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Grant, 1991). Some of these characteristics are not mutually exclusive; the 
value of resources will decline if it becomes less scarce; a resource is less 
valuable and less scarce if it is easily imitable.
 C. Definition of Resources 
   Understanding the definition of a resource in the RBV theory helps 
clarify and outline the idea of what is core competence and how it operates 
within an organization. Comprehension of core competences resides in the 
conceptualization of resources and capabilities in the RBV paradigm. 
Building on Penrose's (1959) seminal contribution, RBV theorists have 
actively begun to identify and appraise the nature of resources that are 
valuable (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece et. 
al, 1997; McGrath et al., 1994). However, there are a number of terms used to 
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identify these resources. Among the comparable terms used in this evolving 
conceptual literature have been: 
 ^ ^ Distinctive competence (Selznick, 1957; Andrews, 1971, Hitt and 
      Ireland 1985) 
^ ^ Strategic resources (Barney, 1986, Dierickx and Cool, 1989) 
^ ^ Core competencies (Dosi et al., 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) 
^ ^ Dynamic capabilies (Teece et al., 1990). 
   Phrases such as firm resources, organizational capabilities, and core 
competencies have been used loosely and interchangeably. All these terms 
are used to describe a strength that the firm relies on to attain competitive 
advantage. 
   Grant (1991) synthesized the various definitions and terms used by 
theorists. He identified six categories of resources: financial, physical, 
human, technological, reputation, and organizational. His work, along with 
that of Nelson and Winter (1982), suggests that capabilities are the 
application of resources. These theorists open the door for examining core 
competences as the interlinking of resources and capabilities. 
   Other RBV theorists have begun to understand what makes these 
resources unique (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece et al, 1997; Conner, 1995). 
They have conceptualized that learning and knowledge is inherent to 
resources and capabilities which give competitive advantage. Dierickx and 
Cool (1989) suggest that assets, resources, and capabilities that can be 
purchased are not the source of abnormal profits or sustained competitive 
advantage. One way to interpret their comments is that assets that involve 
some element of knowledge or learning are difficult to transfer and are 
context sensitive. The RBV theory of the firm places a great deal of 
attention on intangible assets which may be more firm specific and have the 
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potential to be more significant rent-generators than purchasable resources 
(Conner, 1995). Teece et. al. (1997) emphasize capabilities as the 
 "
mechanisms by which firms learn and accumulate new skills and 
capabilities (p.521)." Such capabilities are aimed at deploying and 
coordinating different resources (Teece, et. al., 1997; Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Capabilities are composed of knowledge which occurs from the learning that 
takes place within the organization (Teece et. al., 1997). Learning and 
knowledge are fundamental to the development and the utilization of 
resources and capabilities in RBV theory. This focus is reflected heavily in 
Prahalad and Hamel's (1990) argument that sustained competitive advantage 
is achieved by core competencies which involve "the collective learning in 
the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technology" (p.92). 
   RBV theory views resource use and development as dynamic. 
Resources change as the result of innovative managerial behavior, as it is the 
use of the resources and not the resources themselves that generate profits. 
This model emphasizes how human, physical and intangible resources will 
combine over time to create value. It allows for a dynamic view of firm 
behavior and manipulation of resources. Schumpeter (1950) discussed this 
behavior as a process of "creative destruction," wherein a firm must 
continually renew its resources and abilities by remaining innovative. 
Penrose (1959) also acknowledges that firm behavior is dynamic and that 
firms remain competitive by developing new combinations of resources. 
Firms remain competitive by acquiring new knowledge and skills (Winter, 
1987). 
   The bulk of writing about RBV theory writing focuses on the nature of 
resources and firm strategic behavior, but remains conceptual. Thus in the 
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RBV, firm behavior revolves around the concepts of resources and 
capabilities and how a firm utilizes its unique set of resources and 
capabilities to achieve competitive advantage. RBV goes beyond economic 
models to describe how some firms can generate abnormal profits through 
heterogeneous resources and capabilities. In a similar way, core competence 
is seen a bundle of tangible and intangible resources and tacit know-how, 
that must be identified, selected, developed, and deployed to generate 
superior performance (Penrose, 1959, Wernerfelt, 19M). These scarce firm-
specific assets may lead to competitive advantage.
III. Core Competence Theory
 A. Overview 
   The emerging core competence based view of the firm provides 
opportunity for assessing, deploying, and developing firm specific resources 
and capabilities. It enhances the RBV paradigm by making linkages between 
the competitive advantage of the firm and its resources and capabilities. 
These become more specific in the framework provided by core competence. 
Applying core competence to RBV theory moves the theory beyond the 
abstract to potential for actual application.
B. Core Competence Defined 
   The term "core competence" has been described differently by a number 
of scholars. Dosi, Teece, and Winter (1992) define core competence as "a set 
of differentiated technological skills, complementary assets and 
organizational routines and capacities" (p.521). Winte.rschied (1994) refers to 
"th
e specific tangible and intangible assets of the firm assembled into 
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integrated clusters which span individuals and groups to enable distinctive 
activities to be performed." (pp 271). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) tend to down 
play physical assets and define core competence as the "a technical or 
management subsystem which integrates diverse technologies, processes, 
resources and know-how to deliver product and services which confer 
sustainable and unique competitive advantage and added value to an 
organization." 
   Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argue that to stay competitive in today's 
global markets, it is necessary to seek competitive advantage from a 
capability which lies behind the product that the firm produces. It is this 
ability, that these authors call core competence of the corporation. In their 
view, core competence gives an organization a unique competitive advantage 
because it enables the firm to diversify into new markets by migrating the 
core competence. Similarly, because it is a hidden capability which 
competitors cannot easily imitate, a firm may obtain a dominant position, 
even a near monopoly, in its chosen markets. Prahalad and Hamel's 
definition of core competence focuses on the resources and capabilities 
relating to technology and products in an organization. 
   Other authors have looked at resources and capabilities through the 
lens of distinctive capabilities, distinctive competence, core skills, and 
strategic resources (Selznick, 1957; Wrigley, 1970; Rumelt, 1974; Hofer and 
Schendel, 1978; Snow and Hrebinak, 1980; Barney, 1992). Distinctive 
competences are linked to positive, superior performance (Hofer and 
Schendel, 1978; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993: Selznick, 1952). These 
resources and capabilities are identified as something a firm does better than 
its competitor, the foundation to long term competitive performance, and 
abilities which grow the company (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Wernerfelt, 
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1984; Aaker,  1989; Itami, 1985X). For example, Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) 
suggest that functional areas such as production could be a distinctive 
advantage. Barney (1991), MacDonald (1985), Fiol (1992), and Harrigan (1985) 
move beyond the limitations of distinctive capabilities into the development 
of core capabilities and competence. They propose that such resources and 
capabilities, if they are difficult to buy or imitate, are strategic assets. As 
Amit and Schoemaker state, "strategic assets are a set of difficult to trade 
and imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialized resources and capabilities 
that bestow the firm's competitive advantage (p.36)." 
   The concept of core competences takes a step further in differing from 
other organizational competencies descriptions such as core capabilities and 
distinctive capabilities. Core competences are conceptualized as knowledge 
embedded in the technical subsystem which comprises both the creative and 
implementation capability of the organization to develop technologies and 
applications (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In general, a firm's competence 
involves the differential skills, complementary assets, and routines used to 
create sustainable competitive advantage. Core competence gains strategic 
importance which moves beyond the functional. abilities (Snow and 
Hrebiniak, 1980) and the ability to compete (Aaker, 1989). Core competence 
must have some level of firm specificity found through non imitability. It 
must also, as Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 1994) argue, provide a basis to 
access or enter new markets. It should make a disproportionate contribution 
to the perceived customer value or to the efficiency with which that value is 
delivered. A core competence is an organization's hidden capability of 
coordination and learning which competitors cannot easily imitate. When 
exploited it delivers the organization a near monopoly position in its chosen 
markets. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) assert that it is necessary to seek 
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competitive advantage from a core competence, which lies behind the 
products that serve the market. In their view, core competence gives an 
organization a unique competitive advantage because it enables the 
organization to diversify into new markets by migrating the core competence 
and creates strategic competitive barriers to other firms.
C. Core Competence Development 
   The core competence stance proposes that sustained competitive 
advantage accrues to firms which have resources which are valuable, rare, 
difficult to imitate, and without substitution (Barney, 1994). However, with 
the passage of time these qualities may erode due to changes in the 
competitive environment. Such changes may include a Schumpeterian 
disequilibrium event (e.g., a radical innovation), new consumer attitudes, or 
imitation (Barney, 1994; Brumagim, 1995). To overcome the possible erosion 
of core competences, firms may seek to discover (on purpose or accidentally) 
and use more valuable resources. Researchers are beginning to look at the 
origins and development of core competence. 
   Locus of competence emergence Researchers ascertain through 
anecdotal and case study evidence that the source of new core competences 
occurs through R & D and new product development efforts  (Itami, 1987; 
Prahalad and Hamel, 1994; Winterschied, 1994; Lei, Hitt, and Bettis, 1996; 
Prahalad, 1998). This underlying assumption is widely found in the current 
literature. Theorists suggest that innovation and experimentation may help 
to develop new technologies which improve firm's abilities to serve current 
markets as well as enter new markets (Lei, Hitt, and Bettis, 1996; Prahalad, 
1998). Rosenbloom and Christensen (1994) indicate that participating in new 
technology arenas encourages the development of technical capabilities. 
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   McGrath et  al. (1995) empirically tested the assumption that core 
competences are developed through new product development activities. 
Other conceptual authors generalize even broader sources of new core 
competence. Itami (1987) and Cohen and Levinthal (1990) propose that only 
by internal development do firms gather the tacit ability which leads to non-
imitability. Learning by doing involves the absorption of new information 
and the recombination of current capabilities (Deeds and DeCarolis, 1997). 
The knowledge gained from learning results in new competences. Prahalad 
and Hamel (1994) conceive that new competencies are only developed when 
learning occurs to develop new knowledge bases. Pitt and Clarke (1999) 
propose that "competence development is not the property of the SBUs 
(p.305)", rather, it is an organization wide endeavor. McGrath (1998) holds 
that competence development is a process by which the firm seeks to 
enhance processes, products, technologies, or skills and thus the domain of 
the entire firm. Defining the sources of new core competences as activities 
or initiatives which sponsor learning, opens the question of how firms 
manage it or identify when it is occurring? 
   Process of competence development If competitive advantage is
obtained through core competences, it becomes a critical issue for firms to 
understand and manage the processes that lead to the development of these 
core competencies. This area lacks research as the main thrust of existing 
research focuses on showing that a core competence did indeed develop 
rather than how it was developed (Mascarenhas, Baveja, and Jamil, 1998). 
Competence development has mainly been measured by patent citation and 
bibliometric data (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Deeds and Decarolis, 
1997). Researchers have also looked at the addition of scientific fields and 
technologies as indicators of competence development (Walsh 1995; 
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Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994). 
   C2 researchers have proposed factors which play a role in competence 
emergence (Prahalad and Hamel, 1994; Mascarenhas, Baveja, and Jamil, 1998; 
Prahalad, 1998; McGrath et al., 1994; McGrath, 1998). Pitt and Clarke (1999) 
conceptualize that knowledge orchestration is important to develop new 
competences. This factor allows new efforts to avoid the routines and 
structural boundaries of the firm. McGrath et. al's (1995) study on 
competence emergence used, deftness and comprehension, i.e., similar 
constructs. 
   Factors which are important to competence development have also 
begun to be explored. The Mascarenhas, Baveja, and Jamil (1998) qualitative 
case studies indicate that some environmental and contextual factors play a 
role in competence development. These researchers maintain that exposure 
to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment increases the 
likelihood of competence development. They observed that core competence 
development utilizes the informal corporate culture and goals of that culture. 
Building relationships was also viewed as an important element for the 
development of core competence. In addition, Prahalad (1998) proposed that 
when building new competencies, relationships are important. He states 
that "firms need to invest in extensive socialization, travel, and job 
assignments to build people's networks" (p.102). 
   The C2 concept provides a rich foundation for the explaining, and 
predicting, firm behavior. The concept provides a medium for applying RBV 
theory to understand and manage firm behavior. The current C2 literature 
brings glimmerings of comprehension into this conceptual space. The 
literature suggests that understanding types of competence is important and 
that research is needed to understand the processes by which a competence 
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develops. Further study is needed to understand the evolution and 
development of core competencies in firms. Kikkoman Corporation provides 
an excellent setting for understanding and exploring the historical evolution 
and development of various types of core competences.
IV. Kikkoman
A. Case Synopsis`) 
   Kikkoman Corporation is the oldest continuous enterprise among the 
two hundred largest industrial firms in Japan. Kikkoman's beginnings date 
from the early  I600's and parallels the evolution of the shoyu industry in 
Japan. The history of Kikkoman illustrates the astuteness for developing 
numerous capabilities to maintain their long term success. The widow Mogi 
is credited with the founding activities that led to the modern corporation. 
The family has made constant strategic and operational adjustments as both 
proactive and reactive responses to industry changes. They have developed 
capabilities and utilized them in their strategies to gain sustained 
competitive advantage. For example, in the early 20`h Century Kikkoman 
Corporation took on a new form of organization, introduced modern 
management practices, and developed the relationship between the company 
and its community. These abilities allowed Kikkoman to become one of the 
earliest Japanese firms to internationalize. 
   Kikkoman entered the international markets twice. The first excursions 
extend back at least two centuries, but largely ceased during WWII. The 
company's post-WWII entry into international markets followed the classic 
evolutionary pattern — first exporting into the US market, then establishing 
a marketing organization, and finally building a plant. This led to the major 
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strategic move in the US of building a manufacturing plant in Walworth, 
Wisconsine., the first post-WWII DFI in the US by a Japanese company. In 
the US market the firm has been challenged by numerous competitors and 
has continued to succeed. Although faced with maturing markets for its 
most important product, soy sauce (or shoyu), Kikkoman continues to 
capitalize upon its capabilities while diversifying its product line and 
continuing its impetus for expanding into new country markets.
B. Analysis - A Historical Perspective 
   During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the activities 
begun by the various Mogi family members  joined later by the Takanashi 
families became the Noda Shoyu Company and, since WWII, the Kikkoman 
Corporation. The firm's core competences as they have evolved since the 
17th Century are depicted in Table I. The company has continually 
augmented its skill set since inception. Kikkoman Corp:, its precursory 
companies, and the previous activities undertaken by family members 
allowed Kikkoman to initiate new strategies and secure new opportunities 
(e.g., advertising in Japan in the 19th Century and the US Walworth plant as 
the first Japanese FDI after WWII). Competitors have clearly tried to 
emulate company moves. 
   From the very beginning this family firm has emphasized quality in its 
basic product, i.e., shoyu. The founder obviously was a courageous, 
resourceful, and energetic matriarch. This set of qualities is reflected in 
much of the company/family's history through almost four centuries. The 
location on the Edo River gave access to Japan's largest market, i.e., today's 
Tokyo.1 As the city grew, the family continued to find ways of aggressively 
developing its niche in that market. As the family grew, so did the various 
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talents. The early strategy of the family can be described as backward 
vertical integration, that is, various family members learned various skills, 
such as barrel making, that otherwise would have been undertaken by other 
firms. Obviously the family grew large enough to enable the development of 
this variety of skills. Only in 1918, i.e., almost 300 years after inception, did 
the various family enterprises join together into the combined firm called 
Noda Shoyu Co. The impact of WWI created a competitive situation that 
encouraged family interests to more compactly join forces. 
   Perhaps most intriguing is Kikkoman's emphasis on research and 
development that has led to a line of sophisticated products which students 
might not readily associate with the humble soy sauce that sits on the 
grocery store shelf. The early initiation of R & D activities demonstrates the 
family commitment to the future vitality of its enterprise. Research and 
development activities made tremendous impact on process technology as 
well as proliferating an ever-increasing set of products. The firm appears to 
never waver from becoming more and more efficient at the production of its 
base product and to continually add to its product line. 
   The marketing activities, and especially the development of the brand 
name, are important to note. Kikkoman as a brand has had international 
recognition for over 100 years. The aggressive brand recognition efforts 
intended to differentiate the product began in the early 1800's when Mogi 
 Saheiji received shogunate's recognition for the family premier brand. There 
was aggressive promotion of the brand through multiple tactics. The family 
created a high quality product with a recognized brand name. Mogi Saheiji, 
in particular, added value through brand development. He avoided 
competitive pressure by creating brand loyalty. Brand recognition led to 
higher demand and greater market share. Under these favorable conditions, 
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Evolution of Kikkoman Core Competences Over Four Centuries 
       in the Japanese and International Markets
Time Period:















•> Product Distribution 1834 Mid to late
1800's
•> Brand Image Management Early 18th
1868
•> Advertising/Sales 1881 1918
•> Market Leadership 1890 1976
•> Pricing Power 1890
Exporting 1890
•> Mass Advertising 1950
1956
Production
•> Quality Control 1838 1872
•> Raw Materials Procurement 1894
•> Research & Development 1904
•> Process Technology 1904 1972
•> Economies of Scale 1909 1972






•> Managerial Continuity 17th Century 1957




•> Community Relations 1928 1971
•> Global Learning 1957
Note: Regular type is when development initiated 
    1834); small italics type is when development 
 Distribution= mid to late 1800's)
in Japan (e.g., Product Distribution = 
initiated internationally (e.g., Product
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the company could demand a higher price, thus a higher margin with 
resulting greater profits to invest in the company's other aggressive 
strategies, including R & D activities as well as plant and facilities 
modernization. 
   The company's development of international experience goes back to the 
late 17th century — in short this company has been practicing international 
strategies for over three hundred years. With its import and export 
activities, Noda Shoyu  Company2) gradually developed knowledge and 
experience in dealing with foreign governments and unfamiliar customs and 
business practices. The company also used its relationships with food 
import/export agents to learn about foreign markets. These international 
efforts were clearly recognized by the early 20th Century. 
   The family's development of resources and skills has proven invaluable 
in the international marketplace. Production competencies were capitalized 
upon in their internationalization and acquisition strategy. The ready 
adoption and implementation of new technology led to breweries with 
economies of scale and thus absolute cost advantages. The process 
technology advances were then transferred into the other companies that 
the company acquired (e.g., early 20th Century consolidation by purchasing 
other shoyu companies and, in the post-WWII period, the initial joint venture 
and later purchase of Del Monte product lines). 
   Beginning in 1918 the Noda Shoyu Company also increasingly improved 
its managerial systems and skill by organizing into a single enterprise with 
coordinated decision making. When the individual breweries formed the 
manufacturer's association, only marketing and procurement functions were 
coordinated. All internal functions were independent. Under the new 
organization formed in 1918, all other functions of the company were 
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consolidated within the new corporate structure. Some decisions were 
deliberately made only at the top management level while others were 
delegated to managers of specific product lines or company activities. Such 
coordination in decision making allowed management to determine and 
implement corporate strategies without being caught up in time-consuming 
day-to-day minutiae. This ability stands them in good stead even today with 
the far-flung Kikkoman enterprises. For example, similar patterns can be 
identified in how the firm manages its US operations. 
   The company also learned how to manage its relationships with its 
employees, community, and various other publics. The long 1927-28 labor 
strike was not financially crippling for the company. However, it gave 
impetus to activities to build a strong identity between the employees and 
the company. After the strike, the Noda Shoyu Company began a deliberate 
program to rebuild its relationship with its public image and with Noda City, 
the community where the widow Mogi and her family first launched shoyu 
activities and where much of the firm's identify remains focused today. The 
program included carefully selected acts of corporate philanthropy. The 
company learned that it is important to nurture its relationships with its 
employees and the local community and developed policies and programs to 
support those relationships. 
   The company also developed its community relations expertise through 
its heavy involvement in the city of Noda. The careful attention to 
 "
nemawashi" or root tending is an example of risk management. In Noda 
Kikkoman worked at being a good citizen in order to diminish the work force 
propensity to strike. The company invested in health facilities and education 
for Noda citizens. Such investments helped provide a steady stream of 
educated and healthy workers. Other investments in cultural and civic 
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aspects of Noda assured a social system in which families thrived and good 
workers wanted to stay in the area. Thus the company and community 
became mutually supporting systems. 
   These community skills stood the company in good stead in the 1970's 
as it entered the Walworth. Wis., to build its first US plant. In its entry into 
Walworth and its continuing activities in the immediate region and beyond 
the company reflects how thoroughly those skills have become imbedded in 
the very fabric of the company. The character of the relationship in the 
Walworth plant may differ. However, the low turnover and long list of 
applicants attests to the company's favorable treatment of employees. 
   The results of the application of the company's skill sets in its various 
markets appear in its current financial position. In its fourth century of 
operation, Kikkoman has a strong balance sheet with shareholder's equity 
remaining consistently at about 40% of the capitalization  structure." The 
company has remained profitable and performance overall remains fairly 
consistent. Declining domestic sales (i.e., in Japan) are offset by faster paced 
growth in international markets with higher profit margins. 
   However, financial controls (for example, the continuing Japanese 
appointment to the Walworth controller's position) appear to be the 
Kikkoman approach. Financial controls may not be the appropriate method 
for monitoring and controlling the company's current situation . Financial 
controls are most appropriate in mature, stable industries and discrete 
business units. Increasingly Kikkoman confronts short product life cycles in 
the food industry with many of its new introductions essentially performing 
like food fads. In such circumstances, the company might well put more 
emphasis on strategic or operating control.3)
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C. Development of Competences During the Firm's various phases of 
  international activity.4) 
   The evolution of Noda Shoyu's international activities followed a typical 
four-stage pattern for penetrating a country market as shown  below.
Stage #1 Stage #2
Alliance for 










The company entered each stage by developing and seeking distinct 
advantages. Importing raw materials gave the company access to higher 
quality raw materials and thus continued building the quality image that had 
been the firm's hallmark since its inception. Exporting gave Noda Shoyu 
additional outlet for their shoyu and allowed the company to take advantage 
of economies of scale and thus lower production costs as the technology 
changed. The company followed the export-marketing-manufacture pattern 
twice, before W.W.II and again after the War. By following the depicted 
sequence, Kikkoman Corp. built its knowledge base and expertise in each 
market before making sequentially heavier investment and taking the 
attendant higher risks of the next stage. 
   There were early moves to manufacture in such diverse locations as 
Korea, Manchuria, Indonesia, and the US. The company was a significant 
risk taker from its inception. Its moves after WWII into the US market 
appear tame in retrospect. The disruption of W.W.II and the the height of 
the anti-Japanese sentiment in the US lingered for several decades.6} 
   It is important to note that the company's original export market was 
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people who typically used shoyu, not individuals whom the company had to 
persuade de nova. Thus, the original markets outside Japan were either 
other Asian peoples or Japanese people living in other countries. The 
company initially relied on third parties, that is, agents who were familiar 
with the markets into which the goods were imported. Use of such agents 
was important in the firm's organizational learning process as the agents 
provided information and established the company's groundwork for 
understanding markets and trading needs. Kikkoman's ability to select and 
manage these agents helped the company obtain an advantage over other 
firms. 
   US marketing activities initially took place in territories nearest to 
Japan and where there were greater concentrations of people of Asian origin, 
namely Hawaii and California. Manufacturing facilities, in contrast, were 
located near the source of raw materials. The ability to manage such wide 
spread operations allowed Kikkoman to successfully internationalize.
D. Kikkoman's strategic and operational choices in entering the US market. 
   Only after WWII did non-traditional users begin to be a market for 
shoyu. These were veterans and other individuals who had traveled or lived 
in Japan. The company wisely realized that the traditional markets would 
not provide significant growth opportunities in the W.W.II period and its 
programs to penetrate non-traditional markets were diverse and aggressive. 
Unlike other non-US food manufacturers and marketers, Kikkoman sold a 
non-modified product in the US market and at the same time as pursuing a 
multitude of other non-Japanese foods and recipes. The company had 
already begun the process of "westernizing" soy sauce in its home market 
and thus had some experience in that process. 
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   An important company skill set is Kikkoman's ability to manage a large 
far-flung enterprise with apparently strong controls from corporate 
headquarters, yet with the feeling on the part of the employees that they 
have an impact on the choices that are made. Although Kikkoman 
management espouses a consensus decision-making in the US Walworth 
facility, in the late 1990's three of the top five managers were Japanese. 
Neither executives nor local workers in Walworth expect to attain the most 
senior positions in the US in the near future. The questions might well arise, 
thus, whether the company truly practices what it preaches and what is an 
appropriate pattern for a geographically dispersed firm.7} 
   A major issue for any firm operating a branch office or activity is locus 
of control. The home office must determine how closely to be involved in 
monitoring and decision-making at the local level. Some organizations use 
hierarchy and chain of command as the methods and means of operation to 
evaluate performance at the local level. Other organizations use price/profit 
and the results of operations to evaluate performance.g)Kikkoman appears 
to have successfully master the use of a combination. There is evidence that 
the satisfaction at the local level is very genuine and that the company is a 
good corporate citizen in Walworth, in the state of Wisconsin, and, indeed, in 
the US. 
   In short, the company has developed a superb skill set which it can 
utilize in the application of its strategies. The internationalization of 
Kikkoman demonstrates the firm's superior abilities. Many of these skills 
date from the company's inception — dedication to continuing quality and 
process improvement, for example. The company has been on the forefront 
on many issues among which are research and development, community 
relations, and localization of management. In spite of its age and size, the 
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company appears very nimble. Examination of Kikkoman's four centuries of 
survival and success mandates a healthy respect for a "foreign" competitor 
whose base is a fairly "humble" product!
V. Discussion
   The RBV paradigm emphasizes distinctive, firm specific and thus hard-
to-copy assets, skills, and knowledge. These aspects of the firm are referred 
to generically as core competencies that confer competitive advantage to the 
firms that possess them. Kikkoman's unique competitive position stems 
from its set of abilities which have at different stages contributed to its 
success. The development of these core competences is the result of 
organizational knowledge and learning. Continual learning involves the 
absorption of new information and behaviors and results in recombining of 
current capabilities. 
   Kikkoman's development of various core competences over its history 
has contributed to the firm's ability to remain successful over such an 
extended period of time. Tracking  Kikkoman's development of its success 
factors is essentially a study in ascertaining how the company invested in 
the development of competitive advantages that have kept them in the 
forefront of competition in their niche, i.e., soy sauce manufacture and 
distribution. These various competences and their linkages are difficult to 
replicate and form a barrier to competitors executing the exact same 
strategy. The analysis of the evolution of the success factors profile is 
essentially an analysis based on the resource-based viewpoint (RBV).g} 
   Kikkoman Corporation's skill sets have certainly evolved. The pattern 
of evolution suggests that core competences are often created from prior 
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abilities and can be seen as a tangled network of skills that are recombined 
or blended. The sustained competitive advantage of Kikkoman lies in the 
firms continual quest to enhance and augment its skill sets even as it 
transfer them across country boundaries and product applications. 
However, whether the company will be able to evolve quickly enough to 
remain competitive in the ever-quickening pace of change in the food 
industry is open to question.10) 
   The current study explores the historical development of sustained 
competitive advantage within a large Japanese firm. It illustrates how the 
RBV and competence based strategy can explain the successful strategic 
development of the firm. the study also highlights supports the concept that 
core competences are complex skill sets which are acquired through 
learning and are related to prior abilities. The findings in this study also 
suggest that core competencies can build off each other and are linked when 
utilizing them in strategy as demonstrated by Kikkoman's 
internationalization. Although this explores the use of core competences, 
further work is need to fully determine the network of linkages and how 
these are managed when implementing a strategy.
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 1) For discussion of strategic locational advantages see Michael Porter, "The 
  Competitive Advantages of the Inner City," Harvard Business Review, July-
  August, 1995. 
2) Noda Shoyu Company officially became Kikkoman in 1964. 
3) Collis and Montgomery refer to "Financial Controls" as holding "... 
  managers accountable for a limited number of objective output measures...." 
  While "Operating Controls ... recognize that all sorts of events outside 
  managers' influence ... may affect their performance". Collis and Montgomery 
  depict the latter as encouraging managers to be proactive in rapidly changing 
  environments. (HBR, May-June, 1998, p.78). In a similar vein, an anonymous 
  reviewer of the case manuscript suggested a "distinction .... needs to be made 
  between the purpose and use of financial controls as compared to strategic 
  controls." 
4) See, for example, Jan Johanson and Finn Widersheim-Paul, "The 
  Internationalization of the Firm," Journal of Management Studies, October, 
  1975, pp.305-22: Johanson and Widersheim-Paul suggest that firms may move 
  through four internationalization stages: no regular export activities, export 
  via independent representatives (agents), establishment of sales subsidiaries, 
  and establishment of production facilities (i.e., direct investment). 
  Kikkoman's US entry clearly parallels these four stages. Indeed, pre-WWII 
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," Strategic 
 Management Journal, Vol.11 (1990), pp.117-28; E. Anderson and H. Gatignon, 
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," 
 Journal of International Business Studies, Vol.17 (1986), pp.1-26; and F.R. 
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 1980).] 
6) See, for example, Bernard Saracheck, "Japan Bashing and the American 
 Malaise," Business and the Contemporary World, Vol.IV, No.3 (Summer, 1992), 
  pp.40-48. 
7) See, for example, Philip Kotler who suggests that international marketing 
 organizations tend to fall into one of the following categories: a) an export 
 department, b) an international divisions (including geographic or product 
 groups, international subsidiaries, or matrix organizations) or c) a global 
 organization. [Philip Kotler, Marketing Management. Analysis, Planning, 
  Implementation, and Control,(Upper Saddle River, NJ.' Prentice, Hall, Inc.) 
 p.421-425] 
8) See earlier footnote on financial and operating controls. 
9) The resource based viewpoint (RBV) sees the firm as acting to acquire 
  strategically valuable resources that are potentially the source of sustainable 
  competitive advantage. [See, for example: James G. Combs and David J. 
  Ketchen, "Toward a Synthesis of the Resource-Based View and 
  Organizational Economics in the Context of Grand Strategies," Journal of 
  Business Strategies, Vol.14, No.2 (Fall, 1997), pp.83-105; M.A. Peteraf, "The 
  Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-based View," Strategic 
  Management Journal, Vol.14 (1993), pp.179-191; J.B. Barney, "Firm Resources 
  and Sustained Competitive Advantage, Journal of Management, Vol.17 (1991), 
pp.99-120; and C.K. Prahalad and G. Hamel, "The Core Competence of the 
  Corporation," Harvard Business Review, May-June, 1990, pp.79-91.] 
10) See David J. Collis and Cynthia A. Montgomery, "Creating Corporate
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Advantage," Harvard  Business Review, May-June, 1998, pp.71-83. Collis and 
Montgomery suggest that most companies believe that they are getting the 
alignment of their resources — assets, skills, and capabilities --- in sync when 
in truth they are not. To Kikkoman's credit the company may fit with the 
Collis-Montgomery pattern for success: "Creativity and intuition are 
hallmarks of great corporate strategies ... discipline and rigor ... brilliant 
strategies began with new ideas. These were followed by deliberate 
investments in resources made over many years, the development of a clear 
understanding of the businesses (sic markets) in which those resources would 
be valuable, and the painstaking tailoring of (the organization) to make the 
strategy a reality. Ultimately strategies that prevail are well-constructed 
systems that deliver tangible benefits." (p.83) However, in the current 
environment with increasing pace of change, can Kikkoman deliver sufficient 
new ideas rapidly enough and then follow with the reallocation of investments 
on a timely basis?
i) Research Methodology: The analysis in this paper is based primarily on the 
authors' development of two cases. The first case "Kikkoman Corporation in 
the Mid-1990's: Market Maturity, Diversification, and Globalization" (Case 
Research Journal, forthcoming). The second case compares the company's 
decision to build a second plant in Corvallis, CA with the decision to 
undertake investment in plant in Shanghai, China. The first Kikkoman case 
was based on data from the field, library, and internet sources. The authors, 
thanks to support from the Japanese government and the Institute for 
Training and Development in Tokyo, interviewed executives at the plant in 
Walworth on two occasions, at the marketing offices in California, and at 
corporate headquarters in Tokyo. Among the interviewees were Mr. 
Yazuburo Mogi, as well as senior executives in Walworth and California. 
Some of the interviews were carried out by the entire team and others by a 
single team member. In some instances the interviewer checked back with 
interviewees by phone. In all cases the interviews were kept in notes that 
have provided the field quotes and other observations included in this case. 
The field data was preceded and augmented by data drawn from extensive
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